This book examines the methodology of moral psychology. Its thesis is that a deeper engagement with the social sciences can lead to increased progress in moral psychology, and it proposes that the best way to bring moral psychology and the social sciences together is to use a novel ethical schema that I call "the causal theory of ethics". Available here from Amazon.com.
Intuitions, Naturalism, and Benacerraf's Problem. In S. Bangu (ed.) Naturalizing Logico-Mathematical Knowledge. Routledge.
(with Michel Shamy) Projectibility, Disagreement, and Consensus: A Challenge to Clinical Equipoise. In Theoretical & Applied Ethics. (ungated version)
(with Tamar Kushnir) Development Links Psychological Causes with Evolutionary Explanations. In Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
How (Not) to Bring Biology and Psychology together. In Philosophical Studies. (ungated version)
(with Barbara Koslowski) Intuition vs. Reason: Strategies that People use to Think About Moral Problems. In M. Knauff, M. Pauen, N. Sebanz, & I. Wachsmuth (eds) Proceedings of the 35th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.
(with Michel Shamy) What Statistics Cannot Tell us About the Neurological Exam. In Annals of Neurology.
Review of Evolution and Human Behavior: Darwinian Perspectives on Human Nature. In Philosophical Psychology.
Philosophical Intuitions. In Cohnitz, D. and Haggqvist, S. (eds) The Role of Intuitions in Philosophical Methodology, Studia Philosophica Estonica.